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Abstract
This paper presents a summary overyiew of the fast-deyeloping, field-of "ar
tificial life," stressing aspects that seem especially relevant for the study of de
centralized market economies. In particular, recent artificial life work combining
evolutionary game theory with preferential partner selection is described in some
detail. This work is currently being applied'to the.endogenous.-formation and >' ' , •
evolution of trade networks. ,
' t ' i ' » j » - • ' j »
1. INTRODUCTION
I . 'I . I f' (
What, is "artificial life," or alife for short? And why should economists cafe?" •
-As-detailed in the entertaining, monographs by Levy (1992) and =Sigmund (1993), the
roots of-alife go at least as far back as the work-of.John von-Neumann, in.the nineteen
forties on self-replicating automata.. The establishment of.alife as a distinct field of inquiry,
however, must be traced to the first alife conference,lOrganized in 1987iby'Chris Langton at
the Los Alamos NationalrLaboratory; see Langton (1989). •- j . • •
In a,nutshell,.alife is the bottom-up study of basic phenomena commonly, cissociated with ^
living agents, such.as-self-replication,,,evolution,- adaptation, self-organizationv parasitism,
competition, and cooperation. Alife complements the traditional biological andisocial'sci-
ences concerned with the analytical.and experimental study of living.organisms by attempt
ing to synthesize these phenomena within computers, robots, and other'man-made media.
One goal is to enhance., the descriptive and predictive understanding of actual-and-potential'
^To appear in The Economy as a Complex Evolving System, //',.SFI Studies in4he Sciences ofComplexity,
Addison-Wesley. An earlier abbreviated version appears in Tesfatsion (1995a). Thanks to A. De Vany,
J. Duffy, J. Gray, R. Noir,''B. Routledge, and'espe'ciaHy N. Vriend for helpful comment's. ' *
life processes. A second goal is to use nature as an inspiration for the development of solu
tion algorithms for difEcuit optimization problems characterized byhigh-dimensional search
domains, nonlinearities, and multiple local optima.
The various chemical, biological, social, hardware, and software systems studied by al-
ife researchers are complex adaptive systems sharing the following characteristics [Holland,
1992]. The system consists of many dispersed units acting in parallel, with no global con
troller responsible for the behavior of all units. The actions of each unit depend upon the
states and actions of a Umited number of other units. The overall direction of the system
is determined by competition and coordination among the units, subject to structural con
straints. The complexity of the system arises more from the interactions among the units
than from any complexity inherent in the individual units per se. The local interaction net
works connecting individual units are continuously recombined and revised. In particular,
niches that can be exploited by particular adaptations are continuously created, and their
exploitation in turn leads to new niche creations, so that perpetual novelty exists.
Alife systems are thus continually evolving systems whose global behavior emerges from
the local interactions of distributed units. Although these units might be bit strings,
molecules, or robotic insects, such systems are clearly reminiscent of a Schumpeterian market
economy, only filtered through an unfamiHar terminology.
Theformal studyofevolutionary economic processes has ofcourse been pursued by many
researchers subsequent to Joseph Schumpeter (1976, first published 1942). For example, one
has Armen Alchian's work on uncertainty and evolution in economic systems, the work
of W. Brian Arthur.on economies incorporating positive feedbacks, the work by Richard
Day on dynamic economies characterized by complex phase transitions, the work by John
Foster on an evolutionary approach to macroeconomics, Ron Reiner's work on the origins of
predictable behavior, Jack Hirshleifer's work on evolutionary models in economics and law,
and Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter's work on anevolutionary theory ofeconomic change.
These and numerous other related studies are reviewed by Witt (1992) and Nelson (1995).
In addition, since the ihid-nineteen eighties a number of studies have'focused on potential
economic applications ofevolutionary game theory. As detailed in Friedman (1991), in these
studies a population of game strategies is assumed to be distributed over a fixed number
of strategy types, where each type reproduces over time in direct proportion to its relative
fitness. I: . '. ' ' •.' • • •
Four properties distinguish economic alife work from this earlier work on evolutional}'
economic processes. First, a more explicit account is typically given of the interactions tak
ing place among the-agents of the economic system. Second, a broader range of actions and
interactions is generally associated with these agents, with predatory and symbiotic associa
tions increasingly taking center stage along with self-rrepHcation and self-organization. Third,
these actions and interactions are represented with a.greater degree of'abstraction, permit
ting generalizations across specific system applications;. Fourth; the evolutionary process,
itself, is generally expressed by means of powerful new computational models.^
In particular, for economic alifers, the central problem is to explain thie apparently spon
taneous emergence of regularity in economic processes—e.g.', the unplanned coordination of
trading activities in decentralized market, economies that economists associate with Adam
Smith's "invisible hand." The -challenge is to find a bottom-up explanation for this emer
gence, an explanation rooted in the interactions among individual agents, so that coor
dination is a truly emergent property-of the modelled economy rather' than the result of a
fictitious top-down coordinating mechanism such as a Walrasian auctioneer. In line with this
challenge, rationality is generally viewed as a'testable hypothesis, or at least as a debatable
methodological assumption^ rather than as an unquestioned axiom'of individual behavior.
Several economic studies that focus on key ahfe issues have already appeared; 'see, for
example, Anderson et al. (1988), Arifovic'(1994a);-Arthur.'(1993), Durlauf (1995), Holland
and Miller (1991), Marimon et al. (1990), Marks (1992), and'Sargent (1993). Also, many
additional papers arein thepipeline; e.g., Arifovic (i994b), Arthur et al. (1994), Bell (1994),
Birchenhall (1995)', Bosch and Sunder (1994), Bullard and Duffy (1994), De Vany (1995),
Kirman (1994), Mailath et al. (1994), Routledge (1994), Tesfatsion (1995b), and Vriend
(1994). •:
^For example, the basic-vanilla genetic algorithm used in many economic alife studies generates a fitter
population of agents from an existing population ofagents using the following four steps: (1) Evaluation^
in which a fitness score is assigned to each agent in thepopulation; (2) Selection for Reproduction, in which
a subset of the existingipopulation of agents is selected for reproduction, with selection biased in favor of
fitness; (3) Recombination, in which offspring (new ideas) are generated by combining the genetic material
(structural characteristics) ofpairs ofparents chosen from among the most fit agents in the population; and
(4) Mutation, in which additional variations are' introduced into the' population by mutating the structural
characteristics ofeach offspring with some small (possibly zero) probability. See Mitchell and Forrest (1994).
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To illustrate more concretely the potential usefulness of the alife approach for economics,
as well as the hurdles that remain to be cleared, the following two sections take up a facet of
alife work that appears to be particularly relevant for the modelling of decentralized market
economies. Section 2 describes recent attempts to combine evolutionary game theory with
preferential partner selection (Stanley et al., 1994; Ashlock et al., 1994; Smucker et al.,
1994). Section 3 discusses how a modified version of this framework encompassing a number
of well-known economic applications (e.g., job search) is being used to study the endogenous
formation and evolution of trade networks (Tesfatsion, 1995b).
2. EVOLUTIONARY IPD WITH CHOICE AND REFUSAL
Following the seminal work of Axelrod (1984, 1987), the "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma"
(IPD) game has been extensively used by economists and other researchers to explore the po
tential emergence of mutually cooperative behavior among non-altruistic agents. As detailed
in Kirman (1994) and Lindgren and Nordahl (1994), these studies have typically assumed
that individual players have no control over whom they play. Rather, game partners are
determined independently of player preferences, either randomly or by means of a matching
mechanism such as grid neighborhood or round-robin. The general conclusion reached by
these studies has been that mutually cooperative behavior tends to emerge if the number of
game iterations is either unknown or infinite, the frequency of mutually cooperative play in
initial game iterations is sufficiently large, and the perceived probability of future interactions
with any given current partner is sufficiently high.
In actuality, however, socio-economic interactions are typically characterized by the pref
erential choice and refusal of partners. The question thus arises whether the emergence and
long-run viability of cooperative behavior in the IPD game would be enhanced if players
were more realistically allowed to choose and refuse their potential game partners.
This question is taken up in Stanley et al. (1994) and Ashlock et al. (1994). The tra
ditional IPD game is extended by allowing players both to choose and to refuse potential
game partners on the basis ofcontinually updated expected payoffs.^ This choice and refusal
^Other game theory studies that have allowed players to avoid unwanted interactions, or more generally
to affect the probability of interaction with other players through their own actions, include Guriev and
Shakhova (1995), Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989), Kitcher (1992), Mailath et al. (1994), and Orbell and
Dawes (1993). See Stanley et al. (1994, Section 2) and_ Ashlock et al. (1994, Section 1) for more detailed
mechanism fundamentally modifies the way in which players interact in the IPD game and
the characteristics which result in high payoff scores. Choice allows players to increase their
chances of encountering other cooperative players; refusal gives players a way to protect
themselves from defections without having to defect themselves; and the ostracism of defec
tors occurs endogenously as an increasing number of players individually refuse their game
offers. On the other hand, choice and refusal also pernut opportunistic players to home in
qmckly on exploitable players and form parasitic relationships.
Section 2.1, below, reviews the essenti^ futures ofthe basic.IPD game with choice and
refusal of partners, or "IPD/CR" game for short. Section 2.2 outlines the way in which
the player population has been evolved over time by means of various genetic operations
biased in favor of fit players. Section 2.3 summarizes the simulation results that have been
obtained to date for the evolutionary IPD/CR game. Briefly stated, these results indicate
that the overall emergence of cooperation is accelerated in evolutionary IPD games by the
introduction of choice arid refusal. Nevertheless, the underlying player interaction patterns
induced by choice and refusal can be complex and time varying, even when expressed play
behavior is largely cooperative.
2.1 The Basic IPD/CR Game . : •
The prisoner's dilemma (PD) game is a game with two players. Each player has two
possible moves, "cooperate" c or "defect"(/, and each player must movewithout knowing the
' ' t
move of the other player' If both players defect, each receives a payoffD. If both cooperate,
f
each receives a payoff C which is strictly greater than D. Finally, if one defects and the other
cooperates, the cooperating player receives the lowest possible payoff L and the defecting
player receives the highest possible payoff where'£ < D < C < H. For reasons clarified
below, the payoffs are also' restricted to satisfy (L i- H)/2 <'C. The payoff matrix for the
PD game is depicted in Table 1." ' '' ' ' ' ' ' '
, - r . , 1 j
The dilemma is that, if both players defect, both do worse than if toth had cooperated;
yet there is always an incentive for an individual player to defect. More precisely, the.payoffs
discussions of related game theory work'. There isialso a growing body of work on multi-agent'systems
with endogenous interactions in which the decision (or state) ofan agent depends on the. decision (or state)
ofcertain neighboring agents, where these' neighbors may change over time. See, for example, Brock and
Durlauf(1995). De Vany (1995), and lonnides (1995). » ; . . , i •
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Player 1
Player 2
c d
(C,C) (L,H)
(H,L) (D,D)
Table 1. Payoff Matrix for the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
(C, C) achieved with mutual cooperation are higher than the payoffs {D^D) achieved with
mutual defection. Nevertheless, defection is the best response to any move an opponent
might make. The best response to defection is to defect, because this avoids the lowest
possible payoff L; and the best response to cooperation is to defect, because this achieves
the highest possible payoff H.
The standard iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game consists of the iterated play of a
round-robin ofPD games among a fixed pool ofplayers, each associated with a particular IPD
strategy, i.e., a particular strategy for playing a PD game an indefinite number of times with
an arbitrary partner. In each iteration, each player plays one PD game against each other
player. The only information a player has about a current partner is the history of payoffs
achieved in previous game plays with this partner. The payoff restriction {L H)/2 < C
guarantees that the players cannot escape their dilemma by taking turns exploiting each
other with successive pair plays of (c,^/), ((/, c),
The IPD game with choice and refusal (IPD/CR) is an IPD gamewith the added feature
that players can choose and refuse their game partners. More precisely, at the beginning of
the initial iteration 0, all players assign the same prior expected payoff 7r° to each potential
game partner. Each iteration / > 0 then consists of the following three stages;
Partner Determination Stage. Given any player u, a player k is said to be tolerable
for Vif 7r„(A;) > r, where v^,{k) denotes the expected payoff that player v currently associates
with player k and r denotes an exogenously given minimum tolerance level common across all
players. Each player makes a PD-gameoffer to the tolerable player with whom he currently
associates the highest expected ipayoff,'if any such player exists. Ties are settled by a random
draw. Each player also examines the PD-game offers he has received. Any offer coming from
an intolerable player is refused, which; results''in a refusal payoff R for the refused player,
and any offer coming from a tolerable player is accepted. Consequently, a player is inactive
in the current iteration, in the sense that he neither makes nor accepts any PD game offers,
if and only if he finds all other, players to be-intolerable. Any such inactive player is assigned
&wallflower payoff W. -
. • T ' .(-•'•pi 1
Play "Stage. All non-refused PD game'offers are played out as PD-games, and the
ensuing PD-game payoffs are recofiled. Even if two players eachmake an offer to the other,
only one PD game is played between them.
I I.
Update Stage. Each.player v updates, the current.ejected payoff 7r„(fc) he associates
with each other player k with whomhe has interacted in the previous two stages. Specifically,
ifVhas received a payoffP from an. interaction with k, so that P is either a refusal payoff or a
PD-game payoff, then v updates 7rv(fc) in accordance with a simple criterion filter (Tesfatsion,
1979) of the form: . ,
7r^(fc)^ ^.W7r„(fc) +(1. (1)
where the memory weight uj controls'the relative weighting of'distaint to recent payoffs.
'< ' ' i , ' I ir '
2.2 The Evolutionary IPD/CR Game
During the course of the basic IPD/CR game, the players gather and exploit information
from interactions with potential game partners in order to improve their selection of future
game partners. However, the basic IPD strategy ofeach player remains fixed. The IPD/CR
game is extended to an evolutionary IPD/CR game by considering a sequence of IPD/CR
games separated, by "genetic .steps" during which the current IPD strategies of the players
are allowed to evolve. This evolution of IPD strategies is meant to .capture the, mariner in
which the players make potentially significant changes in their current game behavior based
onpast gameexperiences, both their own and that ofother players. In effect, successful IPD
strategies are mimicked and unsuccessful IPD strategies are abandoned.
In order to implement the evolution of the players' IPD strategies, each IPD strategy
is represented as a bit string that decodes to a finite state machine with a predetermined
initial state 1, henceforth referred to as an IPD machine.^ Figure 1 depicts the IPD machine
representations for two possible IPD strategies: a nice strategy, Tit-for-Two-Tats (TFTT),
and an opportunistically defecting strategy, Rip-Off (Rip).
— INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE—
As seen in Figure 1(a), TFTT starts with cooperation and enters the initial state 1. In
state 1, if the opponent's last move was cooperation, TFTT cooperates and stays in state
1; otherwise, TFTT cooperates and enters state 2. In state 2, if the opponent's last move
was cooperation, TFTT cooperates and enters state 1; otherwise, TFTT defects and stays
in state 2. Consequently, TFTT only defects against a current game partner if that partner
has just defected against him twice in a row.
As seen in Figure 1(b), Rip starts with a defection and enters the initial state 1. In state
1, if the opponent's last move was a defection, Rip cooperates and enters state 3; otherwise,
Rip cooperates and enters state 2. In state 2, if the opponent's last move was cooperation,
Rip defects and enters state 1; otherwise, Rip cooperates and enters state 3. Finally, in
state 3, if the opponent's last move was cooperation, Rip cooperates and stays in state 3;
otherwise. Rip defects and stays in state 3. Hence, Rip continues to defect every other time
against an opponent until such time (if ever) that the opponent retaliates with a defection.
Once an opponent defects against him, Rip reverts to Tit-for-Tat play against this opponent.
As this representation for IPD strategies implies, the only information a player has about
a current PD game partner that affects his current move selection is his play history with
this partner. If a player v has not previously engaged in a PD game with a current partner
k, then u's IPD machine determines an initial move for v. Otherwise, player t;'s play history
with k determines the stale that v is currently in with respect to k and what move was taken
by k in his last PD game play with v. Player u's IPD machine then determines what move
Vshould take in the current PD game.
•^Formally, an IPD machine is characterized by a six-tuple (M,mj,S, 1,A,/), where: M = {c,d} is the
set consisting of the two possible moves for each PD game play, either cooperate c or defect cf; mj € A/ is
an initial move; S is a finite set of internal states; 1 € S is the initial state resulting from the initial move
mj; A ;S XA/ —» Af is an output function indicating the next move to be taken as a function of the current
state and the last move of one's opponent; and f:S x M x M —* S is a. state transition function indicating
the next state as a function of the current state, the last move of one's opponent, and the next move to be
taken. See Ashlock et al. (1994) for a more detailed discussion of IPD machines.
For brevity, the evolutionary aspects of the IPD/CR game will now be outlined using
the same general specifications as used for the simulations reported in Section 2.3, below. A
more extensive discussion of the modelling and implementation of the evolutionary IPD/CR
game can be found in Ashlock et al. (1994)^
The size of the player population is"kept fixed at 30. The arrow labels and state transitions
of the IPD machines for the 30 players are initially chosenat random. Each player has access
to the values ofthe IPD/CR gameparameters (7r°,r, W,a;), and always knows his PD game
play history with each other player as well as his current expected payoff for a PD game play
with each other player. [
The players take part in an evolutionary IPD/CR game consistingof 50 successive single-
generation IPD/CR games separated bygenetic steps. Each single-generation IPD/CR game
is an iteration loop consisting of 150 iterations,through the three-stage choice and refusal
mechanismdescribed in Section 2.1. In the geneticstep occurring at the end of each iteration
loop, a genetic algorithm involvingelitism, recombination, and mutation is used to evolve the
current collection of IPD machines (strategies) associated'with the current player generation.
Roughly stated, elitism' preserves successful move'combinatioris, recombination rearranges
blocks of move'combination's 'without disruption of the blocks, and mutation changes indi
vidual moves. Thus, recombination and mutation both generate new move combinations
with which the players'can experiment, but recombination "globally reconfigures strategies
whereas mutation locally reconfigiiries strategies. The logical'progression of the evolutionary
IPD/CR game is depicted in Table 2. ^ ' " '" '
More precisely," the evolution of the players' IPD machines' in the genetic step at the
end of each iteration loop is accomplished as follows. Each player in the current player
generation is assigned a jitnesh 'score^ taken to be the total sum of his payoffs divided by
the total number of his payoffs. The total number "of a playeir's payoffs is a count of all
rejection, wallflower, and PD-game payoffs that he has received during the course of the
previous iteration loop. The inclusion ofwallflower payoffs in this coiint discouirages players
from evolving into hermits after attaining high payoffs "early in the game.
The 20 most-fit players in the current generation," the elite, are retained for the next
generation, and the 10 least-fit players have their IPD machines replaced by offspring of the
IPD machines of "parent players." These parent players are selected by means ofa roulette
9 .
int main () {
Init() ; • // Specify prior expected payofTs and
// construct initial player generation.
For (G = 0,.",GMAX-1) { // Enter the generation loop.
For (I = 0,...,IMAX-1) { // Enter the iteration loop.
MatchPartners() ; // Determine actual PD game partners,
// given current expected payofis, and
// record rejection and wallflower payofTs.
Play() ; // Implement PD games and
// record PD game payoffs.
UpdateExpO ; // Update expected payoffs on the
// basis of newly recorded payoffs.
}
AssessPitness() ; // Assess and record fitness scores.
If (G < GMAX-1) { '
EvolveGen() ; // Evolve the IPD strategies of the
// CTirrent player generation.
}
}
Return 0 ;
Table 2. Pseudo-Code Depiction of the Evolutionary IPD/CR
wheel procedure (Goldberg, 1989, p. 237). Two parent players are selected five times from
among the 20 elite players, where the probability of a player's selection is given by his relative
fitness score. Since the selection is with replacement, a parent player is allowed to mate with
a clone of himself.
Each pair of parent players produces two offspring via recombination of the bit string
representations for their IPD machines. This recombination is accomplished via one-point
crossover. Suppose, for example, that each IPD machine has 16 states—the specification
maintained in all of the simulations reported below. Each IPD machine is then coded as a
string consisting of 161 bits: one bit for the initial move, with a value 1 denoting cooperation
and a value 0 denoting defection; four bits to represent the destination state of each of the
1
32 state transition arrows;® and one bit for each of the 32 arrow labels to indicate the next
move to be taken by the player given the previous move of his opponent. (The move of the
opponent is indicated by position in the bit string.) A random variable q is generated that
is distributed uniformly over the discrete range 1,2,..., 161. The bits in positions q through
161 of the parental bit strings are exchanged to obtain the bit strings for two offspring.
Next, the bit string of each offspring is subjected to mutation. For the initial move and
^Recall that a string of four bits taking values 0 or 1 can represent 2^ = 16 different states.
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the 32 arrow labels, each^bit is flipped-with, probability'.005.' For the 32 state transition
arrows, selection of any one of the arrows (i.e., all four bits) for mutation occurs with
probability .005. Once a state transition arrow has been selected for mutation, a uniformly
distributed random value is chosen from the discrete range 0,1,..., 15 and coded as a four-
bit representation for a new destination state for the selected state transition arrow. The
resulting bit string for each offspring then decodes into an offspring IPD machine.
Finally, the IPD machine of each of the ten non-elite players in the current player gener-
\ . ' ' ' ' 'atibn IS replaced by one of the offspring IPD machines. The IPD machines for all 30 players
are then reinitialized to state 1, and the expected payoffs of all 30 players are reinitialized to
7r°. In effect, then, the players' memories are wiped clean ofall knowledge ofprevious game
plays. This new generation ofplayers then engages in another IPD/CR game, and the whole
process repeats. Each run of an evolutionary IPD/CR game thus results in a population of
30 players evolved over 50 generations.
2.C Summary of Simulation Findings Ji' -
Emergence of Cooperation
Using round-robin as his matching mechanism, with fixed PD payoff specifications L =
0.0, .Z) = 1.0, C = 3.0i and H = 5.0, Miller (1989)_ found that the meaii'"average fitness
scores® attained by the player generations in his noise-free lPD game exhibited an initial-dip
followed by a steady .rise toward, the mutual cooperation payoff. C!,as the'game progressed.
In simulations of Miller's IPD.game, reportisd in Stanley et al. (1994), we were a;ble to
replicate these results,- When we then-replaced.Miller's round-robin matching mechanism
with a choice and refusal mechanism, the meaniaverage fitness scores attained by the player
generations again ultimately approached the mutualcoop'eration payoff C. However, given a'
minimum tolerance level r > D, the initial dip in the mean'average fitness scores was either
much shallower or missing entirely, indicating, that choice arid refusal tend- to'enhance the
emergence ofcooperation., These findings are illustrated in Figures 2 arid 3.^
®The average fitness score.attained by any player generation gin ah individual run of an IPD or IPD/CR
game is the average fitness score achieved by the players in generation gfor this run. Give multiple runs, the
Jmean average fitness score*" attained by player generation gis then defined to'Be the mean of the average
fitness scores attained by player generation if across the multiple runs. j i ,
Hi
— INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE —
Why might the ability to choose and refuse potential PD game partners accelerate the
emergence of mutually cooperative behavior relative to an IPD game with random or round-
robin matching? Given r > £), a consistently defecting player in an IPD/CR game with
sufficiently many iterations between genetic steps is ultimately ostracized by other players.
Once ostracized, he receives the wallflower payoff in each subsequent iteration and tends to
end up with relatively few offspring in the genetic step. On the other hand, players that are
capable of either defecting and cooperating behavior tend to end up behaving cooperatively
since they are ultimately refused by players tbey frequently defect against.
In short, there axe good reasons to expect that choice and refusal will tend to acceler
ate the overall emergence of mutually cooperative behavior, and our simulation experiments
support this intuition. Nevertheless, a more detailed examination of individual runs reveals
that choice and refusal result in a panoply of interesting player interaction patterns system
atically attuned to the exploitation of the choice/refusal mechanism, and not all of these
patterns result in fully cooperative behavior.
Player Interaction Patterns
The effects of the varied underlying player interaction patterns show up visually as "payoff
bands" when the average fitness scores achieved by successive player generations in individ
ual runs of the IPD/CR game are graphically superimposed. These observed payoff bands
roughly correspond to the average number of times a player defects against another player.
More precisely, forty runs were carried out for each tested IPD/CR parameter configura
tion (7r°,r, using the particular payoff specifications L = 0.0, £> = 1.0, C = 3.0, and H
= 5.0, together with the maintained restriction W = r. When the average fitness scores at
tained by the player generations in these forty individual runs were graphically superimposed,
most scores tended ultimately to cluster around a small number of payoff levels. For some
runs the players quickly evolved into an essentially cooperative population that attained an
average fitness score close to the mutual cooperation payoff level C, whereas for other runs
the players exhibited noncooperative behavior on a more sustained basis (either initially or
repeatedly during the course of each generation) and so achieved an average fitness score
markedly below C. Moreover, for certain tested parameter configurations, some of the runs
12
resulted in low-scoring populations in which'the majorityiof the players ultimately defected
their way into wallflowefdom: An example of the latter type of experiment is depicted in
Figure 4/ . • "• " •-
— FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE—
.
We initially conjectured for the IPD/CR-game that the individual runs ultimately associ
ated with any one payoff band would consist-of similar player types exhibiting similar player
interaction patterns. However, as detailed in Ashlock et al. (1994) and Smucker et al. (1994),
matters are far more subtle than this. Even.if.two distinct player-populations exhibit similar
average fitness scores, the player interaction patterns generating these average fitness scores
can be highly:dissimilar. .These findings have led us away from a focus on payoff bands and
towards a more detailed analysis of player.interaction patterns.
What kinds of player interaction patterns cein arise in evolutionary IPD/CR games? Some
frequently observed patterns are: (i) random, round-robin, or latched partner matchings
between-mutually cooperative players, resulting in mutually.cooperative payoff scores; (ii)
parasitic latching patterns with partially noncooperative behavior, resulting in payoff scores
lying between the mutual cooperation and mutual defection scores; and (iii) "Raquel and
the Bobs" latching patterns, resulting in persistent spiking between the mutual cooperation
and mutual defection payoff scores.
With regard to (i), if the prior expected payoff tt® coincides with the mutually cooperative
payoff. C, and if all players play cooperatively, then, potential PD game partners always
have an expected payoff of C. In this.case,, each player is indifferent concerning whom he
plays, and the choice and refusal mechanism reduces to purely random matching. Jf is
greater than C and .all players play cooperatively' then players keep selecting new partners
in a round-robin fashion as they experience'disappointment from their lower-than-expected
^In contrast, in our replication of the Miller'IPD game, a majority 'of the individual runs ultimately
attained fitness scores clustered around themutually cooperative payoff, while the remaining runs exhibited
scattered average payoffs with no discernible banding; see Stanley et al. (1994, Figure 3). However, this
apparent contrast with the IPD/CR results turns outrto.be somewhat misleading. With round-robin play.
Miller's IPD players interact much more frequently than IPD/CR players, and this makes it more difficult
to detect systematic differences in the number ofdefections by players in different runs. For example, ifeach
player in a generation defects only m times against each opponent and cooperates thereafter, the average
fitness score associated with this player generation will tend toward the mutually cooperative payoff C as
the number of interactions among the players-increasesj'tregardless of the value ofm.
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mutual cooperation payoffs. Finally, if is less than C and all players play cooperatively,
then eachplayerlatches on to the first PDgame partner withwhom he plays; for his expected
payoff for this partner will rise above the payoff tt® he expects from all other partners.
Despite its high averagefitness score, however, a mutually cooperative population is po
tentially susceptible to invasion by opportunistically defecting mutants. To withstand such
an invasion, at least one of two defense mechanisms must be operable. Either the coopera
tive players must be capable of quick refusal of opportunistic defectors, or the players' IPD
strategiesmust permit them to engage in quick retaliatory defections against defecting part
ners so that further defections are discouraged. Otherwise, an opportunistic defector might
be able to avoid refusal payoffs and retaliatory defections by spreading out his defections
over many cooperations, so that the opportunistic defector ends up with a higher fitness
score than cooperative players in the genetic step. If such an opportunistic defector also
plays cooperatively when paired against a clone of himself, he might eventually succeed in
taking over the population.
Suppose cooperative host players are unable to use refusal to free themselves from para
sitical players who initially latch on to them, because the parasitical players manage to keep
their defections within tolerable bounds. However, suppose these host players defect quickly
in response to defections, so that the parasitical players are encouraged to look elsewhere for
new cooperative hosts to defect against. If the number of iterations per generation is large
relative to the number of players, the parasitical players can exhaust the supply of naively
cooperative hosts before the next genetic step is reached. At this point they may latch on
to a previously encountered cooperative host and play cooperatively henceforth.
The result of parasitical behavior can thus be a persistent "predator-prey equilibrium"
in which the initial gains of the parasites through successful defections are just offset by the
high total volume of mutually cooperative payoffs that each cooperative host accumulates
both from actively chosen cooperators and from ultimately cooperative parasites.
An interesting "Raquel-and-the-Bobs" variant of this parasitical interaction pattern has
regularly been observed when the IPD/CR parameters are set as follows: agents are not
overly optimistic [C > 7r°); an initial successful defection does not trigger refusal (wtt® -f
1 —uj\L > r); but an initial mutual defection does trigger disappointment and a search for
a new partner (tt"^ > D). Raquel-and-the-Bobs is best described as the intertwining of two
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interaction'patterns that arise frorn'oiieariother in'endless repetition. A heuristic description
of these two interaction patterns will now be given; a more careful discussion can be'found
in Ashlock et'al. (1994, Section•5:2.3)'and especially• Smucker et al. (1994,'Sectionj5.3);
The first inteiraction-pattern'is ia cooperative'pattern ultimately established among a
population of "Bobs." A Bob is any player that satisfies the following two properties.' First,
in IPD game play with another Bob,ja Bob"initially defects and thereafter cooperates forever.
Second, a Bob- can be transformed:by a'single-mutation of-its IPD-machine (e.g.*, a change'in
initial move) into a. "Raquel" player'that always cooperates'in IPD play with a Bob as well
as in IPD play with another Raquel. Each'Bob starts by cycling through each other Bob as
a potential PD game partner^ driven: by" disappointment at the mutual defection payoffs he
keeps receiving. Eventually each Bob reaches a point where-he has selected each- other Bob
once as a PD game partner and the'^ expected payoff for-future PD game plays with each of
these Bobs is the same. Each Bob will then randomly select another Bob to be his PD game'
partner. This time a mutual cooperation payoff C ,results, and the two delighted Bobs latch.
Because of the -raridom nature of'the'selection,^ a Bob may end up being-paired with several
different Bobs; but all such pairs play cooperatively."
The now fully cooperating populationvof Bobs-hums along until-a'mutation occurs in
an offspring of a Bob that transforms this offspring into a Raquel, ushering in the' second
interaction pattern. The only difference between a Bob-and a''Raiquel'in paired IPD game
play Iis that a Bob-initially defects^whereas a Raquel initially cooperates; "thereafter both
• cooperate. Hence, whenever a Bob first plays'the newly born Raquel,-he attains a high
successful-defection payoff H and latches. On the other hand, the Raquel cycles through the
Bobs seeking a suitable PD game partner, driven by disappointment at the low payoff score
achieved from each initial encounter; In this way 'all Bobs eventually encounter Raquel and
successfully latch, even if Raquel stops'choosing them.
How does Raquel fare in the genetic step? 'The low'L payoffs'that Raquel receives from
initial encounters 'With the' Bobs are offset by the'high Volume of C payoffs that Raquel
ultimately accumulates from latched 'Bobs. Consequently, Raquel can end up achieving a
higher fitness score than the Bobs, for aBob'sustains amutual defection payoff in each initicil
encounter with'another-Bob. In this'case Raqiiel' lias a relatively high probability of being
selected'as a parent in the genetic-step.'-'"^ •''' " • - "• .
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If a second Raquel now happens to be produced in the genetic step, each of the Raquels
accumulates a collection of latched Bobs as well as possibly latching with the other Raquel.
However, given the finite number of iterations between genetic steps, the number of times
each Bob plays each Raquel is fewer than would havebeen the case with only one Raquel in
the population, and this tends to lower the fitness score attained by a Raquel. Conversely,
each Bob now spends less time finding a Raquel, which increases his fitness score.
Unfortunately for Raquel, as the number of Raquels in the population increases, the
fitness score of a Raquel keeps falling relative to the fitness score of a Bob even though the
average fitness score of- the 'population tends to rise. Eventually a point is reached where
all Raquels die out in the genetic step. The next generation of players then consists only
of Bobs, and the cycle repeats. The average fitness scores achieved by the successive player
generations exhibit persistent spiking as the Raquels emerge, increase, decline to oblivion,
and emerge once more.
In summary, as these few examples suggest, a wide array of player interaction patterns
can arise for the evolutionary IPD/CR game,even for a single fixed parameter configuration.
Consequently, it has proven to be extremely difficult to get an analytical handle on the
mapping from parameter configurations to evolutionary IPD/CR outcomes.
A reasonable next step, then, is to focus on more concrete problem settings which impose
natural constraints on the range of feasible interactions. In the next section a modified version
of the IPD/CR framework is used to examine the endogenous formation and evolution of
trade networks among resource-constrained traders.
3. A TRADE NETWORK GAME WITH CHOICE AND REFUSAL
The Trade Network Game (TNG) developed in Tesfatsion (1995b) modifies the evolu
tionary IPD/CR game in three potentially important respects that may help to system
atize the relation between game structure and evolutionary outcomes. First, the TNG is
more concretely realized as an economic buyer-seller game whose players consist of resource-
constrained "tradebots" (virtual robotic traders). Second, the TNG tradebots determine
their trade partners in accordance with a "deferred choice and refusal" mechanism that
combines certain features of the IPD/CR choice and refusal mechanism with features of the
deferred acceptance mechanism developed by Gale and Shapley (1962) for an assignment
16
problem. The trade partner matches obtained for the TNG via-this mechanism exhibit vari
ous stability, socialoptimality, and uniqueness properties. Third, in contrast to the IPD/CR
players, who use a fixed-gain weighted average to.update their expected payoffs, the TNGl
tradebots use a variable-gain weighted average, so that their expected payoffs are consistent
estimates of their true long-run ayerage Ipayoffs. ' ,
Section 3.1 sets out-and motivates/the general TNG framework. To gain, insight into
the subtle interplay-between game play and- the choice and refusal of partners in the TNG,
section 3.2 presents a detailed analysis of an illustrative TNG with five buyer-seller tradebots.
In particular, it is shown that the parameter space for this illustrative TNG partitions
into economically interpretable regions corresponding to. qualita'tively distinct trade network
formations. An-assessment of the TNG from aii ahfe point of view is given in.section 3.3. ^
3,1 The Trade Network. Game , o . .
•The set of players for the TNG is the union V =.BU S ofa nonempty subset B of buyer
tradebots, who can submit .trade offers and a'nonempty subset"5 of se/^er tradebots who
can receive, trade offers,, where B and S may be disjoint, overlapping, or-coincident. For
example, the buyers and sellers might represent customers and retail store owners, workers
and employers, borrowers, and lenders, or auction traders.
Each generation of tradebots participates in a trade cycle loop consisting of a fixed number
of trade cycles. In each trade cycle,'each .buyer m canrsubmit up?to Om trade offers to sellers,
and each seller n.can'accept up.to An trade offers from buyers, where Om and An Oie strictly
positive. One interpretation for the offer quota is that buyer m has a Umited amount
of resources, (credit, labor time, collateral,'...). to,itrade in exchange for other items, and one
interpretation for the acceptance^quota An is that seller n has a Hmited amount of items
(goods, job openings, loans,...) to provide. < . .. t
The, tradebots use a. deferred choice and refusal (DGR) mechanism, to determine their
submission, acceptance, and refusal of trade,offers injeach trade'cycle on the basis of-their
current expected payoffs,,as follows. Each buyer andiseller has,a distinct;exogenously given
minimum tolerance level, in the sense that he will^not trade with anyone whose expected
payoff lies below this level. Each buyer m'first miakes trade offers to a maximum of 0^
most-preferred sellers he finds tolerable, with at most one offer going to any one seller. Each
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seller n in turn forms a waiting-list consisting of a maximum of An of the most preferred
trade offers he has received to date from tolerable buyers; all other trade offers are refused.
If a buyer has a trade offer refused, he can immediately submit a replacement trade offer
to" a tolerable next-most-preferred seller that has not yet refused him. A seller receiving a
new trade offer that dominates a trade offer currently on his waiting-list can substitute this
new trade offer in place of the dominated trade offer, which is then refused. A buyer ceases
making trade offers when either he has no further trade offers refused or all tolerable sellers
have already refused him.®
What kinds of properties characterize the trade partner matching outcomes generated
by the DCR mechanism? First, any such matching outcome is stable, in the sense that
no subset of tradebots has an incentive to block the matching outcome by engaging in a
feasible rearrangement of trade partners among themselves (Tesfatsion, 1995b, Proposition
4.2). Second, define a matching outcome to be B-optimal if it is stable and if each buyer
matched under the matching outcome is at least as well off as he would be under any other
stable matching outcome. Then, in each TNG trade cycle, the DCR mechanism yields the
unique B-optimal matching outcome as long as each tradebot has a strict preference order
over the potential trade partners he finds tolerable (Tesfatsion, 1995b, Proposition 4.3).
A trade offer is an offer by a buyer to a seller to participate in a risky trade, modelled
as a prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. For example, the trade may involve the exchange of a
good or service of a certain promised quality in return for a locin or wage contract entailing
various payment obligations. A buyer participating in a trade may either cooperate (fulfill
his trade obHgations) or defect (renege on his trade obligations), and similarly for a seller.
The trade behavior of each tradebot, whether he is a pure buyer in V —5, a buyer-seller
m B n S, or a pure seller in V —B, is characterized by a finite-memory pure strategy for
playing a PD-game against an arbitrary opponent an indefinite number of times, hereafter
referred to as a trade strategy. Each tradebot thus has a distinct trading personality even
if he engages in both buying and selling activities. No tradebot knows any other tradebot's
strategy a priori] he can only learn about it by engaging the other tradebot in repeated
®A particularly interesting aspect ofthe DCRmechanism is that it requires the tradebotsto talkwith each
other at event-driven times, a requirement that is easily handled by a C++ implementation (seeMcFadzean
and Tesfatsion, 1995).
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trades and observing the payoff history that.ensues. Moreover, eadi tradebot'S choice of an
action in a current trade-with a potential "trade partner is determined entirely on the basis
of the payoffs obtained in past trades with'this same partner.'
The range.-of possible payoffs is the same for each trade in each trade-cycle: namely,
L is the lowest possible: payoff, received by;a'cooperative tradebot whose trade partner
defects; D is the payoff received by a defecting, tradebot whose trade partner also defects;
C is the payoff received by a cooperative tradebot whose trade partner also cooperates;
and H is the highest possible payoff, received by a defecting tradebot whose trade partner
cooperates. More precisely, the payoffs are assumed to satisfy L < .D < Q< C < with
< C. The actual payoffs received by tradebots in each trade cycle are determined
as follows. A tradebot^ receives a payoff of L, D, C, or H from each trade ,(PD game) in
which he participates. A tradebot also receives a refusal payoffs R < 0,. for each trade offer
he submits that is refused; the refuser receives no payoff from this interaction. If a tradebot
neither submi^ nor accepts any trade offers during a trade cycle, he receives a wallflower
payoff, PF < 0. . ,
At thebeginning ofthe initial trade cycle, before any actual trades haye taken place, each
tradebot v associates an exogenously. given prior expected payoff with each potential
trade partner k. Throughout each trade cycle, tradebot v then uses a simple variable-gain
criterion filter (Tesfatsion, 1979) to update his current, expected payoffs on the basis of the
new payoffs he obtains from interactions with his potential trade partners. In particular, if
tradebot Vreceives a payoff P frpm an interaction with a^potential trade partner then v
forms an updated expected payoff for k by taking a convex combination of this new payoff
P and his previous expected payoff for k, where the inverse of the weight on P is 1 plus
tradebot vs current payoff count with k. In this way, tradebot v keeps a running tab on
the payoff outcomes of his interactions with L As explained in Tesfatsion (1995b, Section
5), this updating procedure guarantees that the expected payoff tradebot v associates with
k converges to the true average payoff v attains from interactions with kasthe number of
mteractions between v and k becomes arbitrarily large.
At the eiid of a trade cycle loop, the tradebots enter a genetic step in which trade
strategies successful in past trades are retained while trade strategies unsuccessful in past
trades are replaced by variants of more successful strategies. (To facilitate comparisons; the
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finite state machine, fitness definition, and genetic algorithm used in the genetic step to
represent and evolve the tradebots' trade strategies are the same as used for the IPD/CR
game.) At the end of the genetic step, a new trade cycle loop commences.
Several economic applications of the TNG will now be sketched. As these applications
illustrate, the classification of tradebots as buyers or sellers, the specification of prior ex
pected payoffs, and the specification of minimum tolerance levels are three simple ways in
which trade interactions can be made to reflect particular trading institutions.
Case 1: Joh-Search Modelled as an N-Armed Bandit Game with Choice and Refusal
The subset B consists of one worker and the subset S consists of A'' —1 employers,
where B and S are disjoint. The worker can either submit a work offer to one of the
employers or choose to be unemployed and receive the known payoff W. The employers can
refuse work offers. Once matched, a worker and employer play the following PD game: the
worker decides whether to cooperate (exert high effort) or defect (exert low effort) on the
job, and the employer decides whether to cooperate with the worker (provide good working
conditions) or defect against the worker (provide bad working conditions). Consequently,
information about productivity and working conditions gained from on-the-job experience
influences subsequent quits (failures to renew" offers) by the worker and layoffs (refusals of
renewed offers) by employers.
In the usual N-armed bandit problem, each arm passively provides a random reward.
This TNG special case thus represents an extension of the N-armed bandit problem to an
N-armed bandit game in which all but one of the arms is an active agent engaging in strategic
decision making.
Case 2: A Labor Market Modelled as an Assignment Game with Choice and Refusal
The subset B consists of M workers and the subset S consists of N employers, where B
and S are disjoint. Each worker m can submit work offers to a maximum of Om employers,
or he can choose to be unemployed and receive the known payoff W. Each employer n can
hire up to An workers, and employers can refuse work offers. As in the previous example,
once matched, a worker and employer engage in work site interactions modelled as a PD
game.
This TNG special case extends the usual assignment problem (cf. Gale and Shapley,
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1962) by incorporating subsequent strategic game play between matched pairs of agents
and by having game play iterated over time. Assignment problems are commonly^ used by
economists to model job-matching in labor markets as well as other economic processes, but
• } . ' ' ' ' ' 'v'
the payoffs to each potential pair of partners are usually-specified a priori.
Case 3: A Labor Market with Endogenously Determined Workers and Employers
The subsets B and S coincide. lEach' tradebot v can submit up to Oviwork offers to
tradebots at other work sites and receive up to Av work offers at his own work site. The
degree to which any accepted work offer results in satisfactory outcomes for the participant
tradebots is determined by subsequent PD game play. Ex post, four pure types of tradebots
I ' • • i
can emerge: (1) pure workers, who work at the sites of other tradebots but have no tradebots
working for them at their own sites; (2) pure employers, who have tradebots working for
them at their own sites but who do not work at the sites of'other tradebots; (3) unemployed
tradebots, who submit at least one' work offer' to a tradebot at another' site but who end
up neither working at other sites nor having tradebots working for them at their own sites;
and (4) inactive'(out of the work force) tradebots, who neither submit nor accept any work
offers. • • ' _ '
Case '4' A Double Auction Game with Choice and Refusal
Each tradebot' can submit and receive trade offerSj so that B and S coincide, and each
tradebot has a zero minimum tolerance level. The set V of tradebots is partitioned into two
subsets, X and Y. Each tradebot in X is endowed with one unit of a good x of variable
quality that is potentially desired by the tradebots in Y, and eadi tradebot in Y is endowed
with one unit of a good y of variable quality that is potentially desired by the tradebots
in X. The exchange rate of x for y is exogenously determined to be one for one. Each
tradebot in X only assigns a nonnegative prior-expected payoff to tradebots in K, and vice
versa. Consequently, the tradebots in Y submit trade offers to, and accept trade offers
from, the tradebots in X^ and conversely, but no trade interactions take place among the
tradebots in X or among the tradebots in Y. The actual value of an accepted trade offer
to the participant tradebots is determined by subsequent PD game play, where cooperation
denotes the provision of a high-quality good and defection denotes the provision of a low-
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quality good.
Case 5: Intermediation with Choice and Refusal
The buyer subset B and the seller subset S overlap but do not coincide. The pure buyers
in V—S represent "depositors," the buyer-sellers in BOS represent "intermediaries," and the
pure sellers in V —B represent "investors." The depositors offer funds to the intermediaries
in return for deposit accounts, and the intermediaries offer loan contracts to the investors in
return for a share of earnings. The degree to which accepted offers are satisfactorily fulfilled
is determined by subsequent PD game play.
3.2 An Illustrative 5-Tradebot TNG®
Consider a TNG for which the player seiV = B = S contains a total of five buyer-seller
tradebots. Each tradebot v has the same minimum tolerance level, Ty = 0, and assigns a
negative prior expected payoff to trade with himself. In addition, each tradebot has the
same quotas, Ov = I and Ay = 4, on the number of trade offers he can submit and accept in
any given trade cycle. Thus, each tradebot can have at most one outstanding trade offer at
any one time; but each tradebot is effectively unconstrained with regard to the number of
trade offers he can have on his current waiting-list,,for he receives at most four trade offers
during the course of any one trade cycle. Also, the refusal payoff R is assumed to be strictly
negative, and the wallflower payoff W is assumed to be 0.
With regard to trade strategies, three of the tradebots are TFTTs and the remaining
two tradebots are Rips (cf. Section 2.2 and Figure 1). A TFTT receives a payoff sequence
(C,C, C,...) in repeated trades with another TFTT and a payoff sequence (L, C, L, C,...) in
repeated trades with a Rip, and a Rip receives a payoff sequence [H, C, C,...) in repeated
trades with a TFTT and a payoff sequence (jD, C, C, ...) in repeated trades with another Rip.
Note that a Rip never triggers defection in a TFTT since a Rip never defects twice in a row.
Consequently, in any match-up between a TFTT and a Rip, the Rip would definitely attain
a higher fitness score than the TFTT if the TFTT were not permitted to refuse the Rip's
trade offers.
®The specifications for this illustrative TNG were chosen to permit comparisons with a 5-player IPD/CR
game analyzed in Stanley et £il. (1994, pp. 153-156). See Tesfatsion (1995b, Section 7.3) for the details of
this comparison.
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One key factor affecting the emergenceof trade networks in the TNG is the specification
of the tradebots' prior expected payoffs. Low prior expected payoffs encourage tradebots to
latch on to the first trade partner from whom they receive even a modestly high payoff. On
the other hand, high prior expected payoifs encourage repeated experimentation with new
1 ,
trade partners in the face of continually disappointing payoffs from current trade partners. As
will be seen below for the TFTTs, the combination of high prior expected payoffs and wide
spread experiirientation can be' 'detrimental to nice tradebots since it increases their chances
of encountering opportunistically defecting trade partners whose defections are infrequent
enough to avoid triggering refusals. ' '
Two alternative benchmarks assumptions will be considered for the tradebots' prior ex
pected payoffs, Uy{k), for their potential trade partners. The first assumption, a common
prior, is the assumption made in Stanley et al. (1994), Ashlock et al. (1994), and Smucker et
al. (1994) for the IPD/CR. The second assumption, long-run expectations, sets the prior ex-
pected payoffs that any two tradebots have for each other equal to the true long-run average
payoffs that would result if these two'tradebots were to engage in infinitely many trades.
Assumption (CP): Common.Prior. Each tradebot associates the same prior expected
payoff, with each other tradebot, where lies in the open interval from 0 (^the minimum
tolerance level) to H (the high^t possible trade payoff). , .
Assumption (LR): Long-Run Expectations. Each TFTT associates a prior ex
pected payoff C with each other TFTT and a prior expected payoff (L -|- C)/2 with each
Rip; and each Rip associates a prior expected payoff with each TFTT and a prior
expected payoff C with each other Rip.
Another key factor affecting the types of trade networks that can emerge in the TNG
is the extent to which the benefits and costs associated with each potential trade partner
balanceoiit over time, either tri^ering eventual refusal or permitting long-termpartnership.
It is therefore useful to examine the various possible 2-tradebotmatch-ups for the illustrative
5-tradebot TNG before entering into an analysis of the full-blown'model. -
Given the form of the criterion filter that the tradebots use to update their expectations,
a TFTT never judgesanotherTFTT to be intolerable; ,for the expected payoff ofa TFTT for
another TFTT isalways nonnegative. Similarly, a Rip never judges a TFTT to be intolerable.
' ' ' 1 ^ '
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However, a Rip can become intolerable for another Rip or for a TFTT. In particular, as
established in Tesfatsion (1995, Section 7), under assumption (CP) one obtains the following
four behavioral regions as the prior expected payoff ranges from low to high values:
(CP.l) <U^ < ~D: a TFTT finds a Rip intolerable after only one trade, and
a Rip finds another Rip intolerable after only one trade;
(CP.2) —D < < —L: a TFTT finds a Rip intolerable after only one trade,
and a Rip never finds another Rip intolerable;
(CP,3) —L < and C < —L: a TFTT finds a Rip intolerable after a finite
odd number of trades, and a Rip never finds another Rip intolerable;
(CP.4) —L < and —L < C: a TFTT never finds a Rip intolerable, and a
Rip never finds another Rip intolerable.
In contrast, under (LR) one obtcdns four regions characterized by somewhat different tran
sient behaviors as the mutual cooperation payoff C ranges from low to high values:,
(LR.l) 0 < C* < —D: a TFTT finds a Rip intolerable prior to trade, and a Rip
finds another Rip intolerable after only one trade;
(LR.2) —D < C < ~L\ a TFTT finds a Rip intolerable prior to trade, and a
Rip never finds another Rip intolerable;
(LR.3) —L < C < —31^: a TFTT finds a Rip intolerable after only one trade,
and a Rip never finds another Rip intolerable;
(LR.4) —3i/ < C: a TFTT never finds a Rip intolerable, and a Rip never finds
another Rip intolerable.
What, then, are the possible trade networks that can emerge in this 5-tradebot TNG
over the course of a single trade cycle loop, assuming either (CP) or (LR) is in effect?
Possible Trade Networks Under Assumption (CP)
At the beginning of the initial trade cycle, each tradebot judges each other tradebot to
be equally tolerable, and he uses random selection to submit a trade offer to one of these
tradebots. In turn, each tradebot places all received trade orders on his current waiting-list,
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with no refusals. In •accordance with the DCR mechanism, each-tradebot then accepts all
trade offers on his current waiting-list: ' >.. f
" Suppose that payoffs and prior expected payoffs are configured as in (CP.l). In this case,
even though a Rip receives the highest possible payoff, from an initial trade with a TFTT,
which encourages him to submit another.'.trade offer to this TFTT in the next trade cycle,
the TFTT neither submits trade offers to, nor accept trade offers from, this Rip after their
first trade. Moreover, the two Rips cease all trade activity with each other after their first
trade. Under the DCR mechanism, a tradebot receiving a refusal payofffrom a refused trade
offer during the course of a trade cycle immediately submits a replacement' trade offer to
any nextrmost-preferred tolerable tradebot who'has hot.yet refused him. Consequently,' by
the end of the first four trade cycles-, a Rip' has triggered refusal in every one ofhis potential •
trade, partners. Thereafter the Rip submits.trade offers only to the TFTTS, receiving only
negative refusal payoffs, in return, until the expected payoff he associates -with,each TFTT
finally.drops below zero'and.he turns into a wallflower. •, • '
In summary,, by the end of the"fourth- trade cycle, the' only trade networks that are
viable for case (CP.l) involve'trades among the three TFTTs, with 'both Rips ostracized-
and eventually reduced -to wallflowers;- cf.'Figure 5(a), The fitness score of each TFTT
thus tends towards the mutually cooperative payoff, C, whereas the fitness score of each
Rip tends toward the wallflower payoff, 0. Whether of not the Rips survive and prosper in
the genetic step at the end of. the trade cycle loop'then' depends on the length of this loop.
Specifically, in order for a Rip to end up with-a higher fitness score than the TFTTs, the loop
must be short enough so that the H ipayoffs received by the Rip from his initial successful'
defections against the three TFTTs sufficiently outweigh the mutual defection payoff," D,
that he receives from his one Rip-Rip trade, any refusal payoffs, i?, that he'receives from
subsequent refused attempts to trade with the TFTTs, and any wallflower payoffs, 0, that
he receives after ceasing all trade activity. , 'T ; •'
—INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE—
•Cases (CP.2) and (Ct^.S) are similar to case,(CP.l), except that'the .two Rips end up'
trading.cooperatively with each'^ other rather than as wallflowers; cf. Figure 5(b). Also, in
case (CP.3) the TFTTs may take longer to reject the opportunistically defecting Rips. The
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fitness scores ofall tradebots thus tend toward the mutually cooperative payoff, C, but it, is
now more likely that the Rips will have a higher fitness score than the TFTTs at the end
of any given trade cycle loop and hence a reproductive advantage in the subsequent genetic
step.
Suppose, now, that case (CP.4) holds with -L < U° < {H G')/2. As established in
Tesfatsion (1995b, Proposition 7.1), the only long-run trade networks viable in this case
consist of the three TFTTs engaged inmutually cooperative trades with otherTFTTs, with
each Rip latched on to one randomly determined TFTT. Figure 5(c) depicts the case in
which each Rip happens to be latched on to a different TFTT.
In this case, then, each TFTT risks becoming a full-time host for a parasitical Rip. Prior
expected payoffs are low enough to encourage latching behavior on the part of the Rips, who"
are delighted with their unexpectedly high payoffs from the TFTTs, but not low enough to
induce theTFTTs to refuse the Rips. Although the average payoff, (X +C)/2, that a TFTT
receives from repeated trades with a Rip is nonnegative and possibly positive, it is not as
high as the average payoff accruing to a Rip from such trades, (i/" + C)/2, nor as high as the
average payoff, C, that accrues to a TFTT in repeated trades with another TFTT. Hence,
the relative fitness of a TFTT is lowered by interactions with a Rip, and this puts him at a
reproductive disadvantage in the genetic step. •
It is interesting to note that at least one TFTT always avoids becoming parasitized by
a Rip in case (CP.4) with —L < < [H + C')/2. The fitness score of any such TFTT
tends towards C, whereas the fitness score of each parasitized TFTT is uniformly bounded
below C. The structurally identical TFTT tradebots thus end up, by chance, with different
fitness scores. Nevertheless, given a sufficiently long trade cycle loop, each Rip exits the loop
with a higher fitness score than each TFTT; for the fitness score of each Rip tends towards
(^ + C)/2.
Next, considercase (CP.4) with —(i/+C)/2. In this case, as established in Tesfatsion
(1995b, Proposition 7.2) and depicted in Figure 5(d), each Rip stochastically switches his
trade offers back and forth among the three TFTTs for the duration of the trade cycle loop.
Hence, each TFTT always has a positive probability of being parasitized by each Rip. The
reason for the formation of this type of trade network is that a Rip is indifferent between
any two TFTTs with whom he has traded an even number of times. •
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Finally, consider case (CP.4) withj(i/" +.C)/|2 < -U^ < H. As established in Tesfatsion
(1995b, Proposition 7*;3) and depicted in.Figure/5(d), each TFTT is^now^a recurrent host for
each of the parasitical Rips by the endiof .the fourth trade cycle. The intuitive reason for the
formation of this type of trade network is that'each Rip's priorexpected payoff for a TFTT
is so high that he essentially always prefers the TFTT with whom he has currently traded
the least, and this leads him to repeatedly cycle his trade offers among the three TFTTs.
As in the previous (CP.4) cases, the fitness score of each Rip in this final (CP.4) case
tends toward Jn contrast to the previous '(CP.4) cases, however, no TFTT
now has any ,chance,of'escaping-parasitization by all three Rips. 'Consequently, the fitness
score of all three TFTTs is uniformly, bounded below C for all sufficiently long trade cycle
loops. Here, then,, is an .example where..optiniistic prior'expectationsj leading to increased
experimentation, turnout to ,be detrimental'for": the nicer'tradebots.
, . • - • * • • ' ' (/ 'ill,!." '> •!
Possible Trade Networks Under Assumption (LR)
r) ..1 f '
Comparing the behavioral regions-.under, (LR) with the behavioral regions under ,(CP),
one sees that the TFTTs tend t^ behave,more cautiously under (LR)" because their prior
expected payoffs are less optimistic. In particular, .a TFTT's prior expected payoff for a Rip.
is bounded strictly below Cunder (LR|^d may even .be, negative. Consequently, no TFTT
ever subnuts a trade offer^tp a^ ^P.- -Moreover, aTFTT will not accept an initial trade .offer
from a Rip under (LR) unless the^benefit, (7,.from amutual cooperation is-atrleast as great
as the cost, —L,, that is incurred when the Ri^ successfully defects,against him.
Consider^ now, the .trade networks that can emerge under (LR).ilii^the initial trade cycle,'
each TFTT uses random selection to submit a trade,offer to one particular TFTT, and all'
such trade offers are accepted. Each Rip likewise uses random selection to submit a trade
offer to one particular TFTT; but whether or not these trade offers are accepted depends on
the behavioral reeion. •, -
In case (LR.l), a TFTT refus^ aU trade offers from.a Rip, prior to any trades taking,
place. Under the DCR mechanism, a tradebot. who has a trade offer refused immediately
subniits ^ replacement trade offer to.any next-most-preferred,tolerable tradebot .who has not.
yet refused him. Thus, by the end of the initial trade cycle, each Rip has made one trade offer
to each TFTT which was refused, and one trade offer to,the other Rip which was accepted.
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Nevertheless, after this one trade, the Rips find each other intolerable and never submit
trade offers to each other again. In subsequent trade cycles each Rip only submits trade
offers to the TFTTs, collecting negative refusal payoffs until, finally, his expected payoff for
each TFTT drops below zero. Thereafter each Rip subsides into wallflowerdom; cf. Figure
6(a).
—INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE—
Case (LR.2) differs from case (LR.l) in only one respect—^the Rips never find each other
intolerable. Thus, in the first few trade cycles, each Rip uses sequential random selection to
submit a trade offer to each TFTT in turn, who refuses the offer, and then to the other Rip,
who accepts the offer. Since each refusal results in a negative refusal payoff, i2, the expected
payoff that each Rip associates with each TFTT eventually drops below the expected payoff
that each Rip has for the other Rip, which is always nonnegative. In each subsequent trade
cycle the Rips submit trade offers only to each other; cf. Figure 6(b).
The interesting aspect of both (LR.l) and (LR.2) is that each TFTT is able to use
refusal to protect himself completely from the Rips, so that he never sustains any low L
payoffs. Thefitness score ofeach TFTTat theend ofthe trade cycle loop is thus C, because
C is the only payoff he ever experiences. In contrast, each Rip sustains negative refusal
payoffs as well as at least one negative defection payoff before finally setthng down either
to wallflowerdom in case (LR.l) or to mutually cooperative trades with the other Rip in
case (LR.2). Consequently, the fitness score of each Rip at the end of any trade cycle loop
is definitely below C and may even be negative. It follows that each TFTT has a higher
fitness score than each Rip at the end of any trade cycle loop, and hence has a reproductive
advantage over each Rip in the subsequent genetic step.
Case (LR.3) is similar to case (LR.2), except that each Rip is able to obtain one high H
payoff from each TFTT (inflicting a low negative L payoff on each TFTT in the process)
before collecting refusal payoffs. It is therefore possible for a Rip to end up with a higher
fitness score than a TFTT in the subsequent genetic step. In general, then, as depicted in
Figure 6(c), neither theTFTTs nor the Rips have a definite long-run reproductive advantage
under case (LR.3).
Finally, suppose case (LR.4) holds. The TFTTs continue to submit trade offers only to
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each other in each succ^sive trade cycle; but, iunlike the previous (LR) cases,'they never
refuse trade oifers received from a Rip. Consequently, a/Rip never submits a-traide offer to
the other Rip; for the trade offers he submits to the persistently more attractive TFTTs are
never refused.
Indeed, not surprisingly, the behavior of the-Rips-in case (LR.4) is very similar to the
eventual behayior of .the Rips in case.(CP.4)>with.£/'° ='{'H +'C)/2. Throughout the trade
cycle loop, each Rip randomly selects ,a •'TFTT. to^ trade'with after every even-numbered
trade with,a TFTT. The result is that, in every other trade^cycle,-each TFTT hcis-a positive
probability of becoming a host for each parasitic'Rip for the next-'two trade cycles, and the'
Rips never trade with.each other at all; .cf.' Figure-6(d). •It follows that-each Rip ends up
with a higher fitness score than each TFTT, regardless ;of the length'of the trade cycle loop.
Comparing Figure 6 with.Figure 5,ithe TFTTs have an easier time'protecting themselves
against the Rips .in case (LR), where.they have ah'accurate priorunderstanding of the payoffs
they can expect to obtain from ,each type of traldebot.- While this amount of information
may be excessive, it does seem reasonable .to.^suppose that, based-on past bad'experiences,
nice tradebots develop more'.cautious priors for untested trade partners than'do street-wise'
opportunistic tradebots on- the look-out foriichumps;'Alternatively, nice'tradebots might
develop high minimum tolerance levels; so•that .refusal'occurs'quickly; if trades'go sour.'
Haying a minimum tolerance level set equalto'the wallflower payoff, O^ns locally rational, in
thesense that positive.payoffs, however small, result in>^a better^fitness score for a player than
no payoffs at all. Yet a myopic focus on increasing one's own'fitness score in absolute terms
might not lead to reproductive success in the genetic step if other opportunistic tradebots,
such as the Rips are doing even better; cf. cases (CP.4) and (LR.4).
Ideally, then,-prior expectied payoffs-and' miiiiihurn tolerairice levels "should be allowed
to evolve-conjointly with,the tradebot^s' straiegies.^° In addition, as detailed in Tesfatsion
(1995b, Section 8),' it would be interesting-'to experiment'with alternative' specifications
for each module of the TNG: the initialization of the'first tradebot generation; the trade
partner matching mechanism; the interpretation and implementation of trades; the updating
of expectations; and the form of the evolutionary algorithm used in the genetic step. An
^°Some preliminary simulation work along tliese lines in the context of the IPD/CR game can be found
in Ashlock et al. (1994, Section 5.4).
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investigation of these issues will be pursued for the TNG using a C++ platform currently
under development (McFadzean and Tesfatsion, 1995).
3.3 TNG and Alife
The hallmark ofalife is a bottom-Up approach to the study ofsocial and biological sys
tems. Bybridging two complementary hteratures—evolutionary games andoptimal search—
the TNG provides an agent-based economic model within which one can study the endoge
nous formation and evolution of trade networks. Nevertheless, the TNG is still far from
implementing a fully bottom-up perspective.
In particular, the TNG highlights how difficult it is to escape the top-down approach that
characterizes traditional economic modelling, in which fictitious coordinating mechanisms
such as synchronized bids, fulfilled expectations, and market-clearing prices areimposed from
above on interacting agents. The TNG tradebots are surely more autonomous than agents
in traditional economic models. For example, in order to determine their trade partners, the
tradebots talk back and forth with each other at event^driven times. Nevertheless, they stiU
dance to the beat of an external drum that tells themwhen they should commence a trade
cycle loop and when they should commence a genetic step. The advantage ofimposing this
centrally choreographed structure is that it permits some analytical results to be obtained
concerning thestability, uniqueness, and social optimality ofthe trade networks that emerge.
The disadvantage is that these networks may not be robust to realistic relaxations of the
imposed coordinating mechanisms.
4. CONCLUSION
Should economists be interested in alife? The challenges are great, and the payoffs for
economists are yet to be determined, but I believe the answer is yes. Using powerful new
alife simulation tools, it is at last possible to try to test seriously Adam Smith's idea of the
invisible hand. And, happily, alife is also just plain fun.
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FIGURE 1: TWO ILLUSTRATIVE IPD-MACHINES. The expression "ic/y"
means that y is the next move to be taken in response to x, the last move of
one's opponent.
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FIGURE 5: LONG-RUN TRADENETWORKS UNDERASSUMPTION (CP)
FORTHE 5-TRADERTNG. A'relatively larger box indicates a definitely higher
fitness score for a sufficiently longtrade cycle loop. In case (d), the Rip-TFTT in
teractions are stochastic if {H + C)/2 = U° and deterministic if (H + C)/2 < U°.
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FIGURE 6: LONG-RUN TRADE NETWORKS UNDER ASSUMPTION (LR)
FOR THE 5-TRADER TNG. A relatively larger box indicates a definitely higher
fitness score for a sufficiently long trade cycle loop. In case (d), the Rip-TFTT
interactions are stochastic.
